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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
William Kiepke contends the district court erred when it denied his motion to suppress
evidence of drugs and paraphernalia found during a traffic stop.  Specifically, in concluding that
officers had not impermissibly delayed Mr. Kiepke’s detention by abandoning the mission of the
traffic stop in order to conduct a dog sniff, the district court erroneously concluded the delay was
permissible because it was only de minimus.   Both  the  United  States  Supreme  Court  and  the
Idaho Supreme Court have clearly rejected that sort of analysis.
Under the proper analysis, the officer did not have reasonable suspicion to justify the dog
sniff, and so, his decision to abandon the mission of the traffic stop to conduct that dog sniff
unlawfully prolonged the detention.  All the evidence found during the ensuing searches of
Mr. Kiepke’s car and of his person should have been suppressed as poisonous fruit because it
was all come at by exploiting the illegal prolongation of that detention.  As such, this Court
should reverse the order denying Mr. Kiepke’s motion to suppress and remand this case for
further proceedings.
Statement of Facts & Course of Proceedings
Mr. Kiepke was at a gas station around midnight and was having what he described as a
verbal argument with his girlfriend, Rachel.  (Tr., p.7, Ls.11-12; Exhibit 1, 1:24.)1  He started out
talking through the window of her car before he went into the convenience store.  (Tr., p.20,
1 All citations to “Tr.” in this brief refer to the volume containing the transcript of the motion to
suppress hearing held on October 6, 2016.  Exhibit 1 is the video from the officer’s body camera,
which was admitted during the motion to suppress hearing.  (See Tr., p.18, L.14 - p.19, L.16.)  If
it is appropriate, a reference to the relevant time stamp in the video will be included in the
citation.
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Ls.10-17.)  When he came back out, he got into his own car, and his girlfriend got into the
passenger seat.  (Tr., p.10, Ls.17 - p.11, L.3.)  She got out soon after, and Mr. Kiepke began to
drive away.  (Tr., p.11, Ls.11-13.)
A police officer had been observing their interactions.  Specifically, he was watching
Rachel,2 who the officer considered to be a person of interest in a drug investigation.  (See
Tr.,  p.7,  Ls.24-25.)   The  officer  also  considered  this  gas  station  to  be  a  “high  drug  trafficking
area.”  (Tr., p.7, Ls.11-17.)  However, he did not provide any details to explain why he thought
Rachel was a person of interest, nor did he report seeing any exchange occur between
Mr. Kiepke and Rachel.  (See generally Tr.)  In fact, the officer admitted he did not make note of
anything particularly suspicious about Mr. Kiepke’s behavior at the gas station in his report.
(Tr., p.20, L.22 - p.21, L.2.)  He simply felt “the whole thing was suspicious.”  (Tr., p.20, L.25 -
p.21,  L.1.)   However,  he  also  ran  Mr.  Kiepke’s  license  plate  information  and  learned  that
Mr. Kiepke did not have an Idaho driver’s license and his driving privileges were suspended in
two other states.  (Tr., p.8, L.20 - p.9, L.14.)  As a result, he ultimately pulled Mr. Kiepke over
for failing to signal as he left the gas station and because he did not have a valid driver’s license.
(Tr., p.12, Ls.5-6.)
The officer did not mention the failure to signal at all when he approached Mr. Kiepke;
instead he only asked about his lack of a driver’s license.  (See Exhibit 1.)  Mr. Kiepke admitted
he did not have a valid license, but was working to get one.  (Tr., p.12, Ls.4-21; Exhibit 1.)
Mr. Kiepke provided the officer with an identification card as well as the registration information
and proof of insurance for the car.  (Tr., p.12, Ls.23-25.)  After only a minute and one-half, the
2 The  officer  indicated  that  one  “Rachel  Vaughan”  was  the  driver  of  the  other  car.   (Tr.,  p.8,
Ls.11-12.)
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officer had Mr. Kiepke get out of the car so that he could conduct a dog sniff on the car.  (Exhibit
1; Tr., p.13, Ls.6-14.)  The officer frisked Mr. Kiepke, found nothing of note, and had
Mr. Kiepke sit on the front of the patrol car while he went to conduct the dog sniff.  (See Exhibit
1; Tr., p.13, Ls.4-5.)  The officer admitted that, while he was conducting the dog sniff, none of
the other officers on scene were writing tickets for the traffic violations.  (Tr., p.26, Ls.11-19.)
The dog alerted on the car, and a subsequent search of the car found marijuana and
various items of drug paraphernalia.  (Tr., p.14, Ls.6-7, p.15, L.21 - p.16, L.15.)  At that point,
the  officer  placed  Mr.  Kiepke  under  arrest  for  possession  of  marijuana,  possession  of  drug
paraphernalia, and failure to purchase a driver’s license.  (Tr., p.15, Ls.13-15.)  Officers then
searched Mr. Kiepke incident to that arrest and found methamphetamine in one of his socks.
(Tr., p.16, L.16 - p.17, L.17.)
Mr. Kiepke subsequently moved to suppress the evidence found in this case based on the
fact that the officer had unlawfully prolonged the detention by abandoning the mission of the
traffic stop in order to conduct the dog sniff.  (R., pp.56-62.)  The district court denied that
motion.  (Tr., p.34, Ls.20-22.)  Specifically, it concluded the dog sniff was valid because “[t]here
is no appreciable delay whatsoever between the time of justified stop for driving without a
license and failing to use a turn signal and the canine circling the vehicle and alerting”; “[t]his is
unlike a number of cases where stops were prolonged for multiple minutes on questionable
grounds.”  (Tr., p.33, Ls.18-22; p.34, Ls.16-22.)  As such, it concluded the search of the car was
valid based on the dog’s alert, and the search of Mr. Kiepke’s person was valid because it was
incident to a valid arrest.  (Tr., p.33, L.24 - p.34, L.7.)
As a result of the district court’s ruling, Mr. Kiepke entered a conditional guilty plea, by
which he pled guilty to possession of methamphetamine while reserving his right to appeal the
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district court’s decision on his motion to suppress.  (See Tr., p.36, Ls.10-13.)  The district court
ultimately imposed and executed a unified sentence of five years, with one year fixed, concurrent
to another case in which Mr. Kiepke had been on parole.  (R., pp.92-93.)  Mr. Kiepke filed a
notice of appeal timely from the judgment of conviction.  (R., pp.95-96.)
5
ISSUE
Whether the district court erred when it denied Mr. Kiepke’s motion to suppress.
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Kiepke’s Motion To Suppress
A. Standard Of Review
The standard of review of a motion to suppress is bifurcated, meaning the appellate court
will accept the facts as found by the district court unless they are clearly erroneous, but it will
review the application of the law to those facts de novo. State v. Kelley, 160 Idaho 761, 762
(Ct. App. 2016), rev. denied.
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution forbids unreasonable searches
and  seizures.   U.S. CONST. amend IV.  Warrantless searches and seizures are presumptively
unreasonable. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390 (1978).  Therefore, a warrantless search is
presumed to violate the Fourth Amendment unless the State demonstrates that one of the
exceptional, well-established, and well-delineated exceptions to this requirement is applicable to
the facts. Id. at 390-91.
B. The District Court Should Have Suppressed All The Evidence Found In This Case
Because It Was Found As The Result Of The Officer Unlawfully Prolonging The Traffic
Stop To Conduct An Unjustified Dog Sniff
The district court decided the dog sniff was properly conducted because “[t]here is no
appreciable delay whatsoever between the time of justified stop for driving without a license and
failing to use a turn signal and the canine circling the vehicle and alerting”; “[t]his is unlike a
number of cases where stops were prolonged for multiple minutes on questionable grounds.”
(Tr., p.33, Ls.18-22; p.34, Ls.16-19.)  Basically, it concluded the dog sniff was proper because it
was only a de minimus delay.
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Both the Idaho Supreme Court and the United States Supreme Court have expressly
rejected that sort of analysis:  “The rule isn’t concerned with when the officer deviates from the
original purpose of the traffic stop, it is concerned with the fact that the officer deviates from the
original  purpose  of  the  stop  at  all.” State v. Linze, 161 Idaho 605, ___, 389 P.3d 150, 154
(2016); accord Rodriguez v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1616 (2015).  That
means, “[w]hile such a brief period of time could reasonably be considered de minimus, the
United States Supreme Court was clear in Rodriguez that de minimus exceptions are no longer
available.” Linze,  389  P.3d  at  154.   Rather,  “[t]he  critical  question  then,  is  .  .  .  whether
conducting the sniff prolongs—i.e. adds time to—the stop.” Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1616
(internal quotation marks omitted).  Therefore, the district court’s decision on the motion to
suppress was based on an improper legal analysis and should be vacated.
Furthermore, the sniff actually did add time to the detention, and thus, was
impermissible.  The United States Supreme Court has held that “the tolerable duration of police
inquires in the traffic-stop context is determined by the seizure’s ‘mission’—to address the
traffic violation that warranted the stop. Id. at 1614.  As such, the detention “may last no longer
than is necessary to effectuate that purpose.” Id. (internal quotation marks and modifications
omitted).  Furthermore, “a dog sniff is not fairly characterized as part of the officer’s traffic
mission.” Id.  at  1615.   Thus,  delaying  completion  of  the  mission  of  a  traffic  stop  in  order  to
conduct a dog sniff (absent some additional fact establishing reasonable suspicion to extend the
scope of the investigation) constitutes an unlawful prolongation of the seizure. Id. at 1616;
accord Linze, 389 P.3d at 154; Kelley, 160 Idaho at 764.
The officer in this case abandoned the mission of the traffic stop so as to conduct a dog
sniff.  The purpose of the stop, according to the officer, was “[b]ecause he didn’t have a driver’s
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license as well as a turn signal violation.”  (Tr., p.12, Ls.5-6.)   The video from the officer’s body
camera  reveals  that  the  officer  never  mentioned  the  failure  to  signal  to  Mr.  Kiepke  at  all.
(See generally Exhibit 1.)  As such, that aspect of the traffic stop was immediately abandoned.
Rather, the officer focused his initial investigation on the status of Mr. Kiepke’s driving
privileges.  (Exhibit 1; Tr., p.12, Ls.14-21.)  However, after just a minute and one-half, the
officer abandoned that investigation as well, deciding to have Mr. Kiepke exit the car so that he
could conduct a dog sniff of the car instead.  (Exhibit 1; Tr., p.13, Ls.6-14.)  The officer admitted
that, while he conducted the dog sniff, none of the other officers on scene were writing tickets
for either of the reasons Mr. Kiepke was pulled over.  (Tr., p.26, Ls.11-19.)  Therefore, the
officers abandoned the mission of the traffic stop, and the dog sniff added time to Mr. Kiepke’s
detention.
Such a prolongation is unlawful if the sniff was not independently justified by reasonable
suspicion. Linze, 389 P.3d at 154 (“This new seizure cannot piggy-back on the reasonableness of
the original seizure.”)  The State failed to carry its burden to prove there was a reasonable,
particularized suspicion of drug activity in this case which would have justified expanding the
scope of the investigation and deploying the dog. See, e.g., Kelley, 160 Idaho at 763; see also
State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 811 (2009) (quoting Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 329
(1990)) (“[R]easonable suspicion requires more than a mere hunch or ‘inchoate and
unparticularized suspicion.’”).
The Court of Appeals decision in Kelley is particularly applicable to this case, because it
was evaluating a case with similar facts in regard to the same question – whether those facts
justified prolonging the stop to allow for a dog sniff. See Kelley, 160 Idaho 761.  The Kelley
Court explained that, although reasonable suspicion is reviewed on the totality of the
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circumstances, when the basis for the alleged suspicion is set forth by drawing adverse
inferences from a collection of otherwise-innocuous facts (such as nervous behavior or unusual
travel plans), there has to be some objective fact connecting those innocuous facts to criminal
activity by this particular suspect. See id. at 764 (“The officer did not testify to any facts
connecting Kelley’s nervous behavior with criminal activity.  Likewise, the officer did not testify
to any objective facts linking Kelley’s unusual travel plans to drug activity.”). Id.  Furthermore,
the fact that “he was driving on the same road others have used to transport drugs,” is not enough
to establish the necessary particularized suspicion. Id.  (“The use of a commonly travelled road
does not give an officer reasonable suspicion to prolong a traffic stop.”).  Rather, in such cases,
the officer is acting on nothing more than a hunch. Id.
As in Kelley, the officer in this case did not testify to any facts connecting Mr. Kiepke’s
behavior in the parking lot with criminal or drug activity.  (See generally Tr.)   Rather,  the
evidence here only shows a collection of otherwise-innocuous behavior:  that Mr. Kiepke was at
a gas station around midnight, went into the store, and argued with his girlfriend.  (See Tr., p.7,
L.6 - p.12, L.6; Exhibit 1, 1:24.)  There was no evidence offered that any exchange of physical
objects took place between Mr. Kiepke and Ms. Vaughan.  (See generally Tr.)  Furthermore,
when the officer frisked Mr. Kiepke, he did not find anything noteworthy.  (See Exhibit 1.)
Thus, the totality of the circumstances does not show a particularized suspicion that Mr. Kiepke
was involved in any sort of illicit activity.  The officer’s testimony actually bears this out.  He
admitted his report did not indicate any of Mr. Kiepke’s actions were particularly suspicious; he
testified he just felt “the whole thing was suspicious.”  (Tr., p.20, L.22 - p.21, L.2.)  In other
words, the officer admitted he only had an inchoate, unparticularized hunch.
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Furthermore, as in Kelley, the only fact presented which might tend to connect
Mr. Kiepke’s otherwise-innocuous actions to drug activity was the officer’s description of the
location as a “high drug trafficking area.”  (See Tr., p.7, Ls.11-17.)  However, as the Court of
Appeals made clear in Kelley, the mere fact that this person was in an area which was open to the
public, even though it has been the sight of others’ past nefarious conduct, is not sufficient to
establish the necessary particularized suspicion to justify prolonging this traffic stop to conduct a
dog sniff of this person’s car. See Kelley,  160  Idaho  at  764.   Therefore,  just  as  in Kelley,  a
consideration of the totality of the circumstances in this case shows the officer was acting on a
hunch when he decided to abandon the mission of the traffic stop and conduct the dog sniff.
Since that dog sniff was not independently justified by reasonable suspicion, prolonging the
detention to conduct that sniff was unlawful, and the evidence found as a result of that sniff
should have been suppressed. See Linze, 389 Idaho at 154.
The suppression of the evidence should include the evidence found during the search of
both Mr. Kiepke’s car and his person, because all that evidence was “come at by the exploitation
of the illegality.” Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 485 (1963).  As such, all that
evidence is fruit of the poisonous tree. Id.; State v. Page, 140 Idaho 841, 846 (2004).
The connection between the illegal action and the search of the car is straightforward.  As
the district court indicated, the officers only gained probable cause to search the car through the
dog’s alert.  (See Tr., p.33, Ls.23-24.)  However, the dog sniff itself occurred during the time the
detention was being unlawfully prolonged.  Therefore, the evidence in the car was come at by
exploiting the illegal prolongation of the detention.
The evidence found on Mr. Kiepke’s person was similarly tainted.  According to the
officer, Mr. Kiepke was placed under arrest after the search of his car for several different
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offenses:  “driving without a driver’s license, possession of paraphernalia, [and] possession of
marijuana.”  (Tr., p.15, Ls.11-15.)  As the district court indicated, the search Mr. Kiepke’s person
was only potentially justified as a search incident to arrest.  (See Tr., p.34, Ls.2-4.)  Because that
search was only conducted due to that arrest and that arrest was premised on evidence which was
found during the search of Mr. Kiepke’s car, and because the search of the car was itself
unlawful since the probable cause to conduct that search arose during an unlawfully-prolonged
detention, the search of his person was come at, at least in part, by the exploiting the illegal
prolongation of the detention.3  That means it was tainted by the unlawfully prolonged detention
and should be suppressed as poisonous fruit. Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 485; Page, 140 Idaho at
846.
Therefore, under the proper analysis, the evidence found on Mr. Kiepke’s person, along
with the evidence found in his car, should have been suppressed.
3 While, as the prosecutor argued below, the officer might have been able to arrest Mr. Kiepke
for driving without a valid license from the outset of the encounter (an action which Mr. Kiepke
does not concede would have been proper), the evaluation of whether the exclusionary rule
applies turns on what the officer actually did, not what he might have, but did not, do. See, e.g.,
State v. Liechty, 152 Idaho 163, 170 (Ct. App. 2011); State v. Bunting, 142 Idaho 908, 917
(Ct. App. 2006); cf. Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1616 (“[t]he reasonableness of a seizure, however,
depends on what the police in fact do.”).  Additionally, this sort of alternative justification for the
search will not expunge the taint of illegal conduct when the alternative basis is intertwined with
the illegal conduct. See, e.g., State v. Barwick, 94 Idaho 139, 142 (1989) (holding that, even
though the defendant had consented to a search, that consent was given after he was illegally
arrested, and the two events were so intertwined that the consent exception did not expunge the
taint of the illegal arrest).  Since the actions the officer actually undertook in this case indicate
the arrest did not occur until after the unlawful prolonging of the detention, and that arrest was
actually intertwined with that illegal conduct, this hypothetical alternate justification does not
expunge the taint in this case.
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Kiepke respectfully requests this Court reverse the order denying his motion to
suppress and remand this case for further proceedings.
DATED this 19th day of June, 2017.
__________/s/_______________
BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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